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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review filed by AppeL. .. *.- .iar;i Orafts is from a 
final order of the Labor Commission of Utah dated July 30, 2003. This 
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63-46b-16? and 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the Commission correctly determined that Mr. 
Crafts did not meet his burden of showing that he sustained a 
"significant impairment" as a result of the 1997 work accident, so as to 
meet the threshold requirement for permanent total disability under 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413. This issue was preserved at R. 303 et. seq. 
Standards "Vf Fit;view 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedure's Act, an agency's factual 
findings will be affirmed if they are "supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole records before the court." See Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
The question of whether an employee is totally and permanently 
disabled is one of fact to be decided by the Commission, based iDon all 
of the evidence in the case. See Kerans v. Industrial Comm'n, 713 P.2d 
49 (Utah 1985). The Commissions' underlying determination that the 
2 
claimant is not significantly impaired from the 1997 event is similarly a 
question of fact reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4). 
The effect of a Compensation Agreement involves a question of 
agency specific law, reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Whether res 
judicata, or other legal doctrines apply, is a conclusion of law. See Smith 
v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
To obtain recovery for any worker's compensation benefits under 
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act (the "Act"), an employee must 
establish that he sustained an "accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment". See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401. This 
statute has been interpreted to require that a claimant establish: (1) he 
sustained an accident; (2) medical causation; and, (3) legal causation. 
These are the threshold requirements of compensability. 
A claimant seeking entitlement to permanent total disability 
benefits has the additional burden of establishing the statutory 
requirements of section 34A-2-413 of the Utah Code. The 1997 version 
of this section reads as follows: 
(1) (b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show 
by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment 
or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease that 
gives rise to the permanent total disability 
entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was 
the direct cause of the employee's permanent total 
disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the 
commission shall conclude that: 
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(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of 
impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic 
work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment 
or combination of impairments prevent the employee 
from performing the essential functions of the work 
activities for which the employee has been qualified 
until the time of the industrial accident or occupational 
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent 
total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably 
available, taking into consideration the employee's age, 
education, past work experience, medical capacity, and 
residual functional capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1997) (Emphasis added).1 
1
 The 1997 version of this statute remains the same as the present 
version of this statute. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings 
This case involves the Utah Labor Commission's denial of workers' 
compensation permanent total disability benefits to Mr. Millard Crafts for 
a back injury sustained between April 16 and June 24, 1997 (the 
"Industrial Accident") while working for Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. 
Following this accident, the parties entered into a Compensation 
Agreement on or about July 20, 1998, which provided voluntary benefits 
to Mr. Crafts for permanent partial disability compensation benefits for a 
3% whole person permanent impairment. 
On March 26, 1999, Mr. Crafts filed an Application for Hearing 
seeking permanent total disability benefits as a result of the Industrial 
Accident of 1997. (R. at 1-2). The Employer (Yellow Freight is self-
insured) filed an Answer on April 30, 1999 and Amended Answer on 
September 7, 1999 denying this claim. (R. at 40, 46). Specifically, the 
Employer denied Mr. Crafts' claim based upon the lack of a permanent 
impairment from the 1997 industrial accident and asserted the prior 
voluntary payment of permanent partial disability benefits had been an 
error. 
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A Notice of Hearing was sent and scheduled for November 2, 1999. 
(R. at 46). That hearing was later continued to January 31, 2001 and 
conducted on that date by Administrative Law Judge Donald George. 
On February 5, 2001, Mr. Crafts filed a Motion for an Interim 
Order. (R. at 185-95). Yellow Freight filed a Reply Memorandum on 
February 16, 2001. (R. at 221-37). 
On March 2, 2001, the Compensation Agreement was signed by the 
ALJ. (R. at 241). 
On December 31, 2001 the ALJ entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order denying Craft's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits. (R. at 252). Crafts filed a Motion for Review on 
January 23, 2003. (R. at 259-67). A response to that motion was filed 
by Yellow Freight. (R. at 274-93). 
On July 30, 2003 the Commission entered its Order Denying 
Motion for Review. (R. at 303-06). 
On August 29, 2003 Crafts filed a Petition for Review with the 
Court of Appeals. (R. at 307). A Docketing Statement was later filed on 
September 8, 2003. 
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Statement of Facts 
The factual history of this case is accurately set forth in the 
Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order as well as the Commission's Order Denying Motion for Review. A 
summary of these facts follows: 
The applicant, Millard R. Crafts, has been a long-haul truck driver 
for approximately thirty years. He was hired by Yellow Freight and 
began working in its Nevada operation in 1988. 
Prior to his employ at Yellow Freight, Mr. Crafts underwent two 
lumber surgeries. A lumbar fusion at L5-S1 in 1972 and an L4 fusion in 
1975 by Dr. Pemberton. (R. 309 at MRE, 190). 
In November of 1991 Crafts injured his neck and low back in an 
industrial accident at Yellow Freight when he fell eight feet off a loading 
dock at its Las Vegas, Nevada Terminal. He suffered injuries to his 
cervical and lumbar spine after this event and continued to treat for the 
next 6 V* years. 
Mr. Crafts was off work for approximately two years and was 
ultimately rated on July 18, 1994 by Dr. Kudrewicz who gave Mr. Crafts 
a 13% whole person impairment rating of which, 7% was attributable to 
the November 1991 injury (5% was attributable to his cervical spine; 2% 
8 
was for the lumbar spine), and the remaining 6% to his pre-existing back 
conditions. (R. 309, at MRE, 148-53). The Nevada State Industrial 
Insurance System (SIIS), Yellow Freight's carrier at that time, took full 
responsibility for the 1991 claim and paid benefits for the impairment 
ratings. (R. 309 at MRE, 152-53). 
From 1994 to 1997 Mr. Crafts worked at Yellow Freight in its 
Denver, Colorado office. The company allowed drivers to use a swinging 
bunk system at that office. This system was suspended with springs to 
allow the off-duty driver to sleep while the on-duty driver continued with 
the route. 
Mr. Crafts then began working in the Salt Lake City operation of 
Yellow Freight on April 13, 1997. Yellow Freight was self-insured for the 
Utah jurisdiction. The Salt Lake City operation did not permit the use of 
the swinging bunk system, but permitted a four inch sponge rubber pad 
to be placed directly on the steel flooring of the sleeper. Crafts began to 
experience increased back pain and other problems which he attributed 
to the inadequate rubber mattress protection. His problems culminated 
on about June 23, 1997 when Crafts was resting in the sleeper of his 
truck while a co-driver was driving. The truck hit a pot hole and jostled 
Crafts. 
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Mr. Crafts sought additional medical treatment and on February 7, 
1998, Dr. Anderson issued a medical report. The report provided a 10% 
whole person impairment rating. Of this rating, 3% was "apportioned to 
his injury with Yellow Freight." (R. at 309, MRE, 223-24). A careful 
reading of the report shows that the 3% rating relates to the 1991 
industrial accident with Yellow Freight, which is referenced in the report. 
It does not relate to the 1997 Industrial Accident with Yellow Freight, 
which is never mentioned in the report. In fact, no permanent 
impairment rating has ever been assigned to the 1997 Industrial 
Accident. 
On about July 20, 1998, Mr. Crafts and Felicia Hildreth, an 
adjustor for Yellow Freight, submitted a Compensation Agreement (Form 
019) to the Commission. The Compensation Agreement set forth the 
method of computation of Mr. Crafts' temporary total disability 
compensation and also stated that Mr. Crafts was entitled to permanent 
partial disability compensation for a 3% whole person impairment, 
totaling $2,484.92. (R. At 241). The agreement was not approved by the 
Labor Commission at that time due to lack of required documents. The 
record and the parties agree that the Compensation Agreement 
mistakenly attributed a 3% permanent impairment to the 1997 
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Industrial Accident. In fact, the 3% rating was attributable to Mr. Craft's 
1991 work injury with Yellow Freight, covered by SIIS, and, therefore, 
should not have been paid as Mr. Crafts had already received an 
impairment rating and benefits. 
On March 26, 1999, Mr. Crafts filed an Application for Hearing 
seeking permanent total disability compensation for the work accident 
occurring between April 16, 1997 and June 24, 1997 while working for 
Yellow Freight. In the Application, Crafts claimed that his disability was 
caused by "gradual increasing spine problems due to jarring' occasioned 
by sleeping in a non 'swinging' bunk in the sleeper cab of an 18-wheeler 
truck culminating in a severe bump/jarring in back when truck hit a 
road bump over Donner Pass, California." (R. at 1-35). 
Yellow Freight denied liability for the permanent total disability 
claim, asserting that Mr. Crafts suffered, at most, a temporary 
aggravation of his pre-existing spine condition from a 1991 accident and 
suffered no new injury or permanent impairment to his spine as a result 
of the 1997 Industrial Accident. Yellow Freight specifically alleged that 
the voluntary payment of the 3% permanent partial disability benefits 
had been an error. 
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On September 7, 2000, Mark Albright D.C., drafted a report 
assessing Mr. Crafts' impairment rating. (R. at 309, MRE, 172). He 
assigns Mr. Crafts an 11% impairment whole person impairment rating, 
however, contrary to the statement of Mr. Crafts, he does not apportion 
any of this rating to the 1997 Industrial Accident. Moreover, after the 
hearing, Mr. Crafts notified and Labor Commission that he waived any 
claim to an impairment rating other than the 3% rating per Dr. 
Anderson's report. 
A hearing was eventually held on January 31 , 2001 before 
Administrative Law Judge Donald George. 
After the hearing, on March 2, 2001, Petitioner resubmitted the 
Compensation Agreement which had been signed by the parties and 
asked for Labor Commission approval. The Agreement was signed by the 
ALJ. (R. at 241). The was done over the objection of the employer. 
On December 31, 2001, the ALJ entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. The ALJ found that Mr. Crafts did not 
present any medical evidence of a permanent impairment rating for the 
1997 industrial accident. Ultimately, the ALJ found that the claimant 
simply incurred a temporary aggravation of his pre-existing 1991 injury. 
Therefore, the ALJ denied Craft's claim for permanent total disability 
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benefits for failure to meet the "significant impairment" requirement 
under Utah's permanent total disability statute - Utah Code Ann. § 34A-
2-413. (R. at 252). 
Crafts filed a Motion for Review on January 23, 2003. (R. at 259-
67). A response to that motion was filed by Yellow Freight. (R. at 274-
93). 
On July 30, 2003, the Utah Labor Commission entered its Order 
Denying Motion for Review. (R. at 303-06). The Commission affirmed 
the ALJ's Order finding that Mr. Crafts failed to establish that he 
sustained a significant impairment from his 1997 Industrial Accident. 
The Commission rejected the claimant's argument that the erroneous 
Compensation Agreement affirmatively establishes a 3% impairment 
rating attributable to the 1997 event, arguably meeting the significant 
impairment prong of the statute. 
Mr. Crafts has since filed a Petition for Review of the Commission's 
Order. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
An essential element of a finding of permanent total disability 
requires that the claimant have a "significant impairment" as a result of 
the industrial accident. The meaning of the term "significant 
impairment" has yet to be defined by statute or appellate case law.2 Mr. 
Crafts provides no medical evidence establishing that his truck driving 
during the period of April 16, 1997 to July 23, 1997 caused any 
permanent impairment. His attempt to meet this statutory requirement 
by reference to a Compensation Agreement which mistakenly provided 
for a 3% whole person impairment rating lacks legal merit. Well 
established Utah law provides that voluntary payments of indemnity 
benefits do not preclude an employer from later challenging the 
compensability of a claim. This doctrine is based upon the public policy 
of providing payments to injured workers in an expedited manner. 
Following the position urged by Mr. Crafts would encourage employers to 
contest all aspects of employment related injuries. 
Finally, Mr. Crafts recitation to various legal doctrines such as res 
judicata and collateral estoppel have no bearing on this case as there has 
2
 This court should be aware that a recent case is on appeal regarding 
the meaning of this term. See Thurston Cable v. Labor Comm'n, Case No. 
20030532-CA. That case is currently in the briefing process, although a 
brief has been filed by the Appellant. 
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not been a prior action. Moreover, the principles of estoppel, cited in 
passing, have not been shown by Mr. Crafts. Accordingly, we ask that 
this Court affirm the Commission's Order denying worker's 
compensation benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION RULES DO NOT APPLY WHEN 
UTAH LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT SUCH AN AWARD. 
Mr. Crafts argues that because Utah law encourages liberal 
construction of the Workers' Compensation Act (the "Act"), he is entitled 
to permanent total disability benefits. Yellow Freight agrees that Utah's 
courts and the Labor Commission should construe the Act in favor of 
coverage and compensation. See Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 
P.2d 676 (Utah 1990). However, this command does not dispense with 
the requirement that an injured party prove his case by a preponderance 
of the evidence. See Lipman v. Ind. Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). 
Indeed, this court held in Jackson v. Industrial Comm'n, Memorandum 
Decision, 920804-CA (Utah Ct. App. 1993), that "regardless of the 
remedial nature of the worker's compensation statutes, a liberal 
construction cannot relieve the applicant from the threshold requirement 
to demonstrate causation." IcL; see Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 
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(allowing workers' compensation benefits only if requirements of 
statutory provision are met). 
As discussed below, because Mr. Crafts fails to meet his statutory 
burden of showing that he "sustained a significant impairment or 
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial accident/' under 
34A-2-413, he is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. 
Point 2. CRAFTS HAS FAILED TO MEET HIS BURDEN TO PROVE 
THAT HE SUSTAINED A "SIGNIFICANT IMPAIRMENT" AS 
A RESULT OF THE 1997 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
A. The Voluntary Payment of Permanent Partial Disability 
Benefits, With Or Without a Compensation Agreement, 
Does Not Relieve a Claimant from Satisfying his Burden 
to Show a Significant Impairment from the Industrial 
Accident for a Claim of Permanent Total Disability. 
To obtain recovery for any worker's compensation benefits under 
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act (the "Act"), an employee must 
establish that he sustained an "accident arising out of and in the course 
of the employee's employment". See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401. This 
statute requires that a claimant establish: (1) an accident; (2) medical 
causation; and, (3) legal causation. These are known the threshold 
requirements of compensability. See Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
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In addition to the threshold requirements, a claimant seeking 
entitlement to permanent total disability benefit must also establish, by a 
preponderance of evidence, the statutory requirements of section 34A-2-
413 of the Utah Code. The 1997 version of this section reads as follows: 
(1) (b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to show 
by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment 
or combination of impairments as a result of the 
industrial accident or occupational disease that 
gives rise to the permanent total disability 
entitlement; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was 
the direct cause of the employee's permanent total 
disability. 
(c) To find an employee permanently totally disabled, the 
commission shall conclude that: 
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed; 
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of 
impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic 
work activities; 
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment 
or combination of impairments prevent the employee 
from performing the essential functions of the work 
activities for which the employee has been qualified 
until the time of the industrial accident or occupational 
disease that is the basis for the employee's permanent 
total disability claim; and 
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably 
available, taking into consideration the employee's age, 
17 
education, past work experience, m e dica l capacity, and 
residual functional capacity. 
Utah £ ° d e A n n - § 34A-2-413 (1997) (Emph^ s i s added). 
/fhe ALJ and Commission correctly d e * e r m i n e d t h a t M r - C r a f t s 
p r e s e ^ t e d no medical evidence of any signific a n t impairment as a result 
of the 1 9 9 7 e v e n t t 0 satisfy his statutory bu*"den-3 Ultimately, the ALJ 
and commission found that the 1997 Indus t r i a l Accident resulted in only 
a temforary aggravation of his pre-existing <?ervical condition, having no 
p e r m g l nen t impairment rating. (R. at 256).4 
^ As noted, Mr. Crafts has attached a C <W o f D r - Albright's report of 
^
 x l % rating. However, this rating was n e v e r attributed to the 1997 
I n d u S t r i a l Accident. Moreover, Mr. Crafts h a s waived his claim of 
i m garment based upon this report. (R. 2 ^ 3 ' 2 4 5 ) - Mso s m c e t h i s i s a 
f a c W f i nding Mr. Crafts must show that tf*ere i s n o substantial evidence 
to s u p P o r t t h e Commission's finding that t b e c l a imant has no impairment 
rating f o r t h e Industrial Accident of 1997. H e h a s not done so. In any 
event e v e n i f M r - C r a f t s i s presenting suc^ a challenge, he has failed to 
m a r s j j a l the evidence. Whitear v. Labor C o i ^ a ^ , 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah 
Ct. ApP- 1 9 9 8 ) -
A
 Although an "impairment" may be temP o r a r y o r permanent, see Utah 
C 0 de Ann. 34A-2-102(8), the meaning of t^ e t e r m "significant" certainly 
r e q u i r e s a ratable impairment. The AMA 0^ l d es read as follows: 
impairment percentages or ratings kevelopeh. ^ 7 medical 
specialists are consensus-derived
 e s t i m a t e s that reflect the 
severity of the medical condition and the degree to which the 
impairment decreases an individual's e^>ilityto perform common 
activities of daily living, excluding w0i"k- Impairment ratings 
were designed to reflect functional limitations and not disability. 
The whole person impairment percen t a S e s listed in the Guides 
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In an intriguing twist of logic, Mr. Crafts attempts to meet his 
burden of proving the "significant impairment" prong of section 34A-2-
413 by relying upon an erroneously executed Compensation Agreement 
which provides for a 3% permanent impairment rating for the 1997 
Industrial Accident.5 He relies upon various legal theories of relief why 
the Compensation Agreement is valid and that the Commission should 
estimate the impact of the impairment on the individual's 
overall ability to perform activities of daily living, excluding work 
The AMA Guides clearly indicate that a person with a 0% impairment 
rating does not have a significant impairment since there is no significant 
anatomic or functional loss. The AMA Guides read: 
A 0% whole person (WP) impairment is assigned to an 
individual with an impairment if the impairment has no 
significant organ or body system functional consequences 
and does not limit the performance of the common activities of 
daily living indicated in Table 1-2. A 90% to 100% WP indicates 
a very severe organ or body system impairment requiring the 
individual to be fully dependent on others for self-care, 
approaching death. 
American Medical Association (AMA) Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment, Fifth Edition, 4-5 (Emphasis Added). 
5
 Mr. Crafts maintains that the presence of an executed and approved 
Compensation Agreement, and the voluntary payment of permanent partial 
disability benefits for a 3% rating by the employer, conclusively binds the 
employer on the elements of legal and medical causation found under 
section 34A-2-401 as interpreted by case law and also precludes the 
employer from denying that this impairment rating is attributable to the 
industrial accident of 1997 for purposes of establishing a "significant 
impairment". 
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impose liability for purposes of permanent total disability. This 
argument not only lacks support by any citation, but is in fact contrary 
to well-established Utah law. 
There is no dispute that the employer and claimant mistakenly 
entered into a Compensation Agreement for a 3% whole person 
permanent impairment rating. As found by the ALJ, the basis of this 
erroneously paid rating was a February 7, 1998 report from Dr. Mark 
Anderson which provides that the claimant has a 10% whole person 
impairment rating. Of this rating, Dr. Anderson stated that 3% was 
"apportioned to his injury with Yellow Freight." (R. at 309, MRE, 224). 
However, as the Commission and ALJ found, a careful reading of the 
report shows that the 3% rating relates to the 1991 industrial accident 
with Yellow Freight rather than the 1997 Industrial Accident. The ALJ 
found, 
Although this report was made after the 6 /23 /97 incident, and 
therefore it might at first glance seem to be related, a close reading 
shows there is no mention by Dr. Anderson of the 6 /23 /97 
incident, but rather only the 1991 fall from the dock. It therefore 
follows that the 3% must be attributed in its entirety to the 1991 
injury. 
(R. at 256.) 
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Mr. Crafts attempts to take advantage of the adjuster's error by 
claiming that the executed and approved Compensation Agreement 
affirmatively establishes a 3% whole person impairment rating for 
purposes of evaluating the "significant impairment" prong of the relevant 
permanent total disability statute. He recites various equitable and legal 
doctrines as a basis for his argument.6 
First, Mr. Crafts relies on basic contract principles in arguing that 
the Compensation Agreement is a binding contract between the parties. 
He maintains that the Compensation Agreement is a legally binding 
agreement with legal obligations. He states that once the agreement was 
approved by the ALJ, the provisions were "legally enforceable." 
The Court of Appeals has stated the following with regard to 
Compensation Agreements: 
The Commission has developed a "Compensation Agreement" 
form. "This form is used by the parties to a workers' 
compensation claim to enter into an agreement as to a 
permanent partial impairment award, and must be submitted 
to the Commission for approval." Workers' Compensation 
Rules and Regulations §§ R490-1-2(P) (effective March 4, 
1986, as amended). The "Compensation Agreement," the 
Commission's Form 019, is used in situations where there is 
no dispute about the occurrence or compensability of an 
accident to document that a claimant "accepts the 
compensation and medical payments paid to date and agrees 
with the permanent partial disability rating shown above." 
6
 His argument should be rejected under Utah App. P. 24. 
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Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, 748 P.2d 582, n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 
(emphasis added). 
Moreover, Rule 612-1-3(P) of the Utah Administrative Code 
provides: 
"Compensation Agreement - Form 219" [aka. 019] - This form 
is used by the parties to a workers' compensation claim to 
enter into an agreement as to a permanent partial 
impairment award, and must be submitted to the Division of 
Industrial Accidents for approval. 
Utah Admin. Code R.612-1-3(P). 
Rule 612-1-9 of the Utah Administrative Code provides: 
A. An applicant, insurance company, and/or employer may 
enter into a compensation agreement for the purpose of 
resolving a worker's compensation claim. Compensation 
agreements must be approved by the Commission. The 
compensation agreement must be that contained on Form 
019 of the Commission forms and shall include the following 
information: 
1. Signatures of the parties involved; 
2. Form 122 - Employer's First Report of Injury; 
3. Doctor's report of impairment rating; 
4. Form 141 - Payment of Benefits Statement. 
B. Failure to provide any of the above documentation and 
forms may result in the return of the compensation 
agreement to the carrier or self-insured employer without 
approval. 
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Utah Admin. Code R.612-1-9.7 
Mr. Crafts places great weight on the "validity" of the Compensation 
Agreement. However, the contractual validity of this document is 
irrelevant. The preparation of the Compensation Agreement and the 
payment of permanent partial disability benefits were all voluntary 
actions on the part of Yellow Freight. This was not an award of benefits 
after the adjudication of a claim. The in-house adjuster at Yellow Freight 
(unfamiliar with and lacking the claim file and full information on the 
1991 industrial accident) clearly made an error in Mr. Crafts' favor by 
paying him additional benefits for an impairment which was due to a 
1991 injury rather than the 1997 Industrial Accident. This mistaken 
payment cannot be used by the claimant to relieve him of his burden of 
proof and bar the Labor Commission from looking to the actual medical 
evidence in this case as the ultimate fact finder. 
This principle is supported by Utah case precedent. In fact, Utah's 
courts have consistently held that the mere fact that an employer 
voluntarily pays benefits does not conclusively determine that the 
employer is thereafter, as a matter of law, barred from contesting 
7
 The Compensation Agreement was initially rejected since the 
appropriate forms were not attached. 
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liability. See Olsen v. Industrial Common. 776 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). In Olsen, the Court stated: 
It would be unjust to both the employee and the insurance 
carrier if the law were that when the insurance carrier once 
undertakes to provide medical or other care for an injured 
[employee] it has lost all right to afterwards defend against 
what it believes to be an unjust or illegal claim. The 
insurance carrier cannot and ought not wait until full 
investigation has been made before providing necessary care 
and treatment for injured [employees]. 
Id. See also 4 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law§ 82.61 at 15-1215 
to 15-1224 (1989) (voluntary payment does not constitute an "award" for 
which proceedings may be reopened nor does it waive the employer's 
right to later dispute the claim). The Utah Court of Appeals recently 
affirmed this position in Olsen v. Ellertson, 2003 UT App 302 
(Memorandum Decision). 
The Court in Harding v. Industrial Common, 28 P.2d 182 (Utah 
1934), similarly reiterated this principle: 
Ordinarily, in the absence of prejudice to the employee or of 
facts giving rise to estoppel, an insurance carrier may, 
notwithstanding voluntary payment of compensation, the 
furnishing of hospital or medical care, the entry of 
appearance, or statement made that the policy covered the 
employee, urge the defense that the employee did not meet 
with an accident,... or that there was no causal connection 
between the injury and disability. It would be unjust to both 
the employee and the insurer if the law were that when a 
carrier once undertakes to provide medical or other care for 
24 
an employee, it has lost all right to defend what it believes to 
be an unjust or illegal claim. 
Harding v. Industrial Comm'n. 28 P.2d 182 (Utah 1934); see Taggart v. 
Industrial Common. 12 P.2d 356 (Utah 1932) (when insurer paid 
compensation to employee, insurer could still deny that employee had 
accident); Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 P.2d 321 (Utah 1943) 
(insurance carrier which voluntarily paid medical and hospital expenses 
of injured employee and paid weekly sum to employee for six years was 
not "estopped" from claiming that the employee was not totally and 
permanently disabled since employee did not change position or 
relinquish any right in reliance on payment); Larson v. Wycoff, 624 P.2d 
1151 (Utah 1981) (stating payment of some of the claims does not itself 
estop carrier from discontinuing coverage under policy). 
Utah's courts have explained that there are significant public 
policies underlying this rule of law and stated that to hold otherwise 
would discourage carriers from making any voluntary payments. See 
Olsen, supra (stating "adopting the position urged by petitioner would 
encourage employers to contest all employment related injures to avoid 
later being estopped from raising their claims"); IcL (citing 4 Larson, 
Workers' Compensation Law § 82.61 at 15-1215 to 15-1224 (1989) 
(voluntary payment does not constitute an award for which proceedings 
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may be reopened nor does it waive the employer's right to later dispute 
the claim)). As Justice Wolfe observed: 
If the insurance carrier could not pay for an indefinite time in 
order to see if there would be an improvement both as to 
extent and as to duration but must seek at once to have 
determined the extent if not duration of his disability, much 
hardship and injustice might ensue to the applicant or to the 
carrier. The Commission would have to hazard a guess and 
once it committed it would be subject to the objection that it 
could not alter its award unless the conditions changed. In 
cases where there is a disability partial or total in extent for 
an indefinite time it is better if the matter be left for future 
determination as long as the party is receiving compensation 
for the support of his family. 
Crow, supra (Wolfe, J. concurring). 
In this case, Yellow Freight voluntarily made payments to Mr. 
Crafts. The Compensation Agreement was created (mistakenly) based on 
an adjuster's effort to take care of a claim and follow Labor Commission 
guidelines. It was not intended or understood by the parties to 
represent a contract. The claim was filed as an aggravation of his pre-
existing condition from an event in June 1997. Mr. Crafts was paid for 
time off work and provided with necessary medical treatment. 
Ultimately, a rating was provided, with the clearly stated explanation of 
its relationship to the original 1991 injury. The Yellow Freight adjuster 
made a mistake by paying the permanent impairment benefits as related 
to the 1997 event. The medical evidence did not support the payment of 
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these benefits as related to the 1997 event, and Mr. Crafts had already 
received permanent partial disability benefits for the 7% rating from 
1991 event. 
However, even if the Court assumes, arguendo ,that the 
Compensation Agreement is a contract, the doctrine of mutual mistake 
has long been recognized as a basis of contractual reformation and 
correction. See Briggs v. Liddell. 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985). In 
Briggs, the court stated that "if the [contractual] instrument does not 
embody the intentions of both parties to the contract, a mutual mistake 
has occurred, and reformation is appropriate". Such is the case here. 
At the time the Compensation Agreement was entered into, the 
parties were under the belief that the claimant was entitled to a 3% 
impairment rating payment. However, since it was later discovered that 
this permanent impairment rating was entered into upon a mistaken 
belief of both parties, reformation principles would certainly absolve the 
parties of this mistake, or at least allow for revision of that agreement. 
Accordingly, on this basis as well, the impairment rating is not binding 
for purposes of establishing "significant impairment." 
Second, Mr. Crafts likens the Compensation Agreement to a Full 
and Final Settlement Agreement. He recites non-jurisdictional law which 
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states that "if the settlement is approved, it takes on the quality of the 
award and the parties can no more back out of it than any other kind of 
award." 
Mr. Craft's recitation to this authority is taken out of context. The 
authority cited from Professor Larson's treatise relates not to a 
compensation agreement, but to attempts by a party to back out of 
approved full and final settlement agreements which are intended to 
have binding contractual effect. See Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-5(B) 
(once approved by the Commission, settlement agreements are 
permanently binding on the parties.). 
Yellow Freight is not attempting to "back out" of paying the 3% 
rating. It is well-settled that once indemnity or medical benefits are paid, 
erroneous or not, a carrier cannot recoup those amounts from the 
injured worker. Yellow Freight simply submits that its agreement to pay 
benefits, pursuant to the Compensation Agreement, is not an admission 
of compensability or impairment for purposes of determining permanent 
total disability. To hold a Compensation Agreement to such a high 
standard is contrary to well-established Utah law and against public 
policy.8 
8
 The Commission has previously indicated that a Compensation 
Agreement has no such binding affect on either party. In a letter dated May 
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Third, Mr. Crafts urges the doctrines of res judicata and, seemingly, 
collateral estoppel. He argues that the Compensation Agreement "is res 
judicata to all issues covered therein." However, neither of these 
doctrines apply here since both require that there be a previous action. 
See Maoris & Assoc, v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f f 19, 20, 37, 16 P.3d 
1214; see also Aragon v. Clover Club Foods, 857 P.2d 250 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Fourth, without any citation to authority, and in passing reference, 
Mr. Crafts urges the doctrine of equitable estoppel. He states that the 
parties are estopped from "relitigating" the issue of Mr. Crafts' 
9, 2001 to Attorney Thomas Sturdy in the matter of John McKelvie, the 
Commission's General Counsel stated the following: 
You have filed with the Labor Commission a motion for 
review of a compensation agreement in the above-referenced 
matter. The Commission does not consider such an 
agreement to be an adjudicative order that can be appealed 
to the Commission. Instead, the agreement represents the 
parties' appraisal of the status of the workers' compensation 
claim as of the date on which the agreement is signed. If 
the employer/insurance carrier comes to believe that the 
agreement is incorrect, it can simply decline to pay the 
disputed benefits. The injured worker can then present the 
dispute the Commission for resolution by filing an application 
for hearing with the Commission's Adjudication Division. 
Likewise, the injured worker can file an application for hearing 
if he or she believes the compensation agreement is inadequate. 
R. at 293. (Emphasis added). 
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permanent impairment rating since the parties reduced their agreement 
by way of a Compensation Agreement. As noted by the Commission, this 
case involves only the present litigation. Thus, the parties are not 
"relitigating" anything. 
Although not cited by Mr. Crafts, the elements essential to invoke 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim 
afterwards asserted, 
(2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission, 
statement or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement or 
act. 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 
(Utah 1979). 
There is no dispute that based upon Dr. Anderson's report, Yellow 
Freight (and the claimant) initially took a position that it should pay the 
3% impairment rating. Yellow Freight has since changed its position 
based upon its discovery that it misread Dr. Anderson's report. However, 
despite this error, Mr. Crafts has not taken any action in reliance of this 
assertion and has not sustained any injury as a result of this action.9 
9
 In any event, he has not adequately asserted this argument in his 
brief to warrant a response or the Court's review. 
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B. The Claimant's Position is Contrary to Public Policy. 
The position urged by Crafts is contrary to wise public policy. An 
employer would undoubtedly be disadvantaged by holding it to an 
impairment rating listed in a Compensation Agreement voluntarily 
entered into due to section 34A-2-413's requirement that a claimant 
show that he sustained "significant impairment" as a direct result of the 
industrial accident. Certainly, this statutory term requires supporting 
medical evidence. 
To adopt Mr. Crafts' position would certainly discourage insurance 
carriers from completing a Compensation Agreement form for fear that 
they could not later contest compensability. This concern is especially 
justified in permanent total disability cases where one of the required 
elements is that the claimant show a "significant impairment". 
In most cases a dispute concerning the compensability of the claim 
may never arise after the payment of permanent partial disability 
benefits. However, to bind an employer by the amounts stated in a 
Compensation Agreement will certainly cause an employer to give greater 
pause and scrutiny to entering into Compensation Agreements. It will 
encourage employers (as was the concern expressed in Olsen and other 
cases) to delay and/or deny the payment of these types of benefits. 
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Employers may be encouraged to fully adjudicate, or at a minimum, send 
all claims for permanent partial disability out for legal review before they 
are paid.10 Resolution of the claim by simply accepting the rating and/or 
compromising the rating among the parties, as is common practice, 
would be undermined. The public policy that Utah has adopted 
encourages employers to voluntarily make payments based upon the 
assurance that if a dispute arises, a claim will be adjudicated based 
upon the facts, rather than a prior adjusting error. This policy applies 
equally in the case of the payment of permanent partial disability 
benefits, with or without a Compensation Agreement. 
Point 3. CRAFTS HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS 
NECESSARY FOR A TENTATIVE FINDING OF PERMANENT 
TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS. 
Mr. Crafts, essentially reiterating his argument in Point II of his 
brief, further argues that he is entitled to a tentative finding of 
permanent total disability simply because the carrier made indemnity 
payments. As noted above, whether a claimant is entitled to permanent 
total disability is an determination to be based upon the medical 
10Given the efforts the Labor Commission has made to minimize 
litigation regarding permanent partial disability benefits (i.e., the Utah 
Impairment Guidelines), this would be an unfortunate and costly 
consequence. 
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evidence, not the erroneous payment of indemnity. See Oman v. 
Industrial Common. 735 P.2d 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The 
requirements for a tentative finding of permanent total disability are set 
forth in Section 34A-2-413, see supra. 
In addition, a claimant is only entitled to a tentative finding of 
permanent total if he proves that he has suffered a "compensable 
industrial injury." Zimmerman v. Industrial Commission, 785 P.2d 1127, 
1132 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (unless the Commission concludes that an 
employee has suffered a compensable industrial injury, it will not 
consider "whether [the employee] qualifies for tentative permanent total 
disability."). This requires that the claimant show medical causation. 
See Smith v. Mitv Lite. 939 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
claimant established medical causation—the uncontroverted facts and 
relevant portions of the medical panel's report as adopted by the 
Commission undeniably establish that an industrial accident caused a 
portion of Smith's physical impairment; that he cannot perform his 
former job; and that he is currently disabled. As such, the Commission 
erred in not making a tentative finding of permanent total disability and 
referring Smith to the division of vocational rehabilitation.). 
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Mr. Crafts has failed to produce evidence which would satisfy the 
five elements articulated above. Particularly, he has failed to produce 
the necessary medical evidence to support an award of permanent total 
disability. The actual medical evidence in this case shows that as a 
result of the 1997 accident, Mr. Crafts suffered, at most, a temporary 
aggravation of his pre-existing condition. There is no evidence of any 
permanent impairment to the cervical spine from the 1997 accident. 
Rather, the medical evidence shows that Mr. Crafts has been rated only 
for a cervical spine impairment from the 1991 accident. (See R., 309, 
MRE at 223, 224.) His current restrictions and limitations have been 
directly attributed back to the 1991 accident. 
The only additional impairment that Mr. Crafts has produced in 
support of his permanent total disability claim is the rating from Mark 
Albright, D.C., who opines that Mr. Crafts is entitled to an 11% whole 
person permanent impairment for his cervical and thoracic spine 
findings. Notably, none of the medical providers, including Dr. Albright, 
Dr. Thoen, Dr. Rich, etc. that evaluated Mr. Craft's thoracic spine films 
have found a direct causal relationship between the industrial accident 
of June 1997 and/or Mr. Crafts's findings, symptoms, complaints or 
disability. Rather, Dr. Thoen, Dr. Rich, and Dr. Anderson relate their 
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opinion that these findings are asymptomatic. (R. at 309, MRE at 194, 
212, 238, 240, .) Dr. Rich notes that the findings appear old. These are 
all the treating physicians. Their opinion is further supported by the full 
review of the records and films performed by Dr. Luers, whose expertise 
is radiology, and Dr. Chung, who concluded that there is no evidence of 
any new injury or impairment from the 1997 Industrial Accident. (R. at 
309, MRE at 376, 379, 380-384.) Thus, even though there may be 
objective evidence of a problem in the thoracic spine upon which Dr. 
Albright provides a rating, no provider has linked these findings with the 
accident and, more importantly, with any disability that Mr. Crafts 
currently suffers. 
Notably, there is no prejudice to Mr. Crafts in allowing Yellow 
Freight to contest liability. Given the nature of Dr. Anderson's letter, Mr. 
Crafts and his counsel should have known of the mistaken payment and 
that he was not eligible for a 3% impairment rating pursuant to Dr. 
Anderson's letter. See Larson, supra, (indicating no prejudice since 
claimant should have known of overpayment). Mr. Crafts has failed to 
allege facts that demonstrate that he changed his position or 
relinquished any rights as a result of receiving the 3% impairment 
benefits from Yellow Freight. 
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Mr. Crafts' claim should be reviewed and adjudicated as any other 
claim. He must be held to the same burden of proof as any other 
claimant before the Commission. He must produce evidence that his 
June 1997 accident resulted in a "significant impairment" which was 
caused him to become permanently and totally disabled. He has failed to 
do this. The medical evidence before the Commission demonstrates that 
Mr. Crafts suffered a temporary aggravation of his pre-existing condition 
from his 1991 injury. He has never been assigned a permanent 
impairment for his cervical spine due to the 1997 accident. While he has 
been assigned a new impairment to his thoracic spine, the medical 
records fail to establish that (1) this impairment is due to the June 1997 
industrial accident; and (2) this impairment causes Mr. Crafts any 
disability as it has been found to be asymptomatic and/or unrelated to 
Mr. Crafts's various symptoms and complaints. The restrictions and 
limitations placed upon him by the physicians has been related to his 
cervical spine. No work limitations or restrictions have been placed on 
him because of his thoracic spine film findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission correctly determined that Crafts is not entitled to 
a tentative finding of permanent total disability. The adjuster's 
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erroneous payment of benefits based upon a Compensation Agreement 
does not conclusively establish a permanent impairment rating for the 
1997 event. Given Crafts has failed to establish the requisite statutory 
requirement of "significant impairment", Yellow Freight respectfully 
requests the Court to affirm the Commission's Order Denying Motion for 
Review. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of June, 2004. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
l^yDOn K>Fetgrsen 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellees 
37 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing document 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid on the is day of June , 2004, 
Utah Court of Appeals (8 copies, one w/ orig. signature) 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Alan L. Hennebold, General Counsel (1 copy) 
Labor Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 1466 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Virginius Dabney (2 copies) 
Dabney & Dabney, P.C. 
South Main Plaza, Suite 2 
1060 South Main Street 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Mr. Crafts 
38 
